Olivier Dagnelie

CV in english (pdf)

Post-doc researcher @ the Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC),

Campus UAB
08193 Bellaterra (Barcelona) - SPAIN
Tel. +34 93 580 6612
Fax +34 93 580 1452

olivier.dagnelie @ iae.csic.es

External Collaborator @ CRED

Research

• "Inequality and Inefficiency in Joint Projects" (with J-M. Baland and D. Ray), 2007, The Economic Journal, 117 (July), 922-935.

  A group of agents voluntarily participates in a joint project, in which efforts are not perfectly substitutable. The output is divided according to some given vector of shares. A share vector is unimprovable if no other share vector yields a higher sum of payoffs. When the elasticity of substitution across efforts is two or lower, only the perfectly equal share vector is unimprovable, and all other vectors can be improved via Lorenz domination. For higher elasticities of substitution, perfect equality is no longer unimprovable. Our results throw light on the connections between inequality and collective action.

• "Rosca Participation in Benin : a Commitment Issue" (with P. LeMay), revised April 2008.

  In the light of first-hand data from a Beninese urban household survey in Cotonou, we investigate several motives aiming to explain participation in Rotating Savings and Credit ASsociations. We provide anecdotal pieces of evidence, descriptive statistics, FIML regressions and matching estimates which tend to indicate that most individuals use their participation in a rosca as a device to commit themselves to save money and to deal with self-control problems.

  Non technical summary prepared for the RES Annual Conference (2008).

• "Life and Death of Roscas: If Power Corrupts, Does Powerlessness Make One Blameless?" , revised February 2007 (To be revised).

  We have very few ideas as to what factors can influence the duration of roscas and reduce their failure risk. In this research, we bring new light on these empirical questions using an original data set containing information on living and dead roscas from Cotonou, Benin. We notice that the groups run by a president alone are more likely to fall apart. We also present evidence that individuals attracted to this type of groups have a lower social capital and therefore might be more likely to default.

• "Inequality and a Repeated Joint Project", mimeo, May 2008.

  Agents voluntarily contribute to an infinitely repeated joint project. We investigate the conditions for cooperation to be a renegotiation-proof and coalition-proof equilibrium before examining the influence of output share inequality on the sustainability of cooperation. When shares are not equally distributed, cooperation requires agents to be more patient than under perfect equality. Beyond a certain degree of share inequality, full efficiency cannot be reached without redistribution. This model also explains the coexistence of one cooperating and one free-riding coalition. In this case, increasing inequality can have a positive or negative impact on the aggregate level of effort.

Lokah Samastha Sukhino Bhavanthu
(May all the beings in all the worlds be happy)